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Historiographical Perspectives
Orthodox View : Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Thomas Bailey, Herbert Feis
Orthodox View : Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Thomas Bailey, Herbert Feis
Views the outbreak of the Cold War as the direct result of Soviet aggression, Stalin’s paranoia, and the expansionist nature of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Stalin deliberately violated the Yalta agreements by imposing totalitarian puppet regimes across Eastern Europe (the "Iron Curtain"). The US response—the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and containment—was a necessary, reluctant, and defensive measure to protect the "Free World" from a dictator bent on global domination.
According to this traditional perspective, was the US policy of containment an act of American empire-building, or a necessary defensive reaction to protect devastated European democracies?
According to this traditional perspective, was the US policy of containment an act of American empire-building, or a necessary defensive reaction to protect devastated European democracies?
If we view Stalin's actions in Poland and Eastern Europe as part of a relentless ideological drive for global communist expansion, how does that change our interpretation of his refusal to hold free elections after World War II?
If we view Stalin's actions in Poland and Eastern Europe as part of a relentless ideological drive for global communist expansion, how does that change our interpretation of his refusal to hold free elections after World War II?
Revisionist View: William Appleman Williams, Gar Alperovitz, Gabriel Kolko
Revisionist View: William Appleman Williams, Gar Alperovitz, Gabriel Kolko
Argues that the Cold War was fundamentally caused by aggressive US economic imperialism and "Atomic Diplomacy." Revisionists criticize the US for trying to force an "Open Door" global capitalist system on a devastated Soviet Union. Alperovitz famously argues that the US dropped the atomic bombs on Japan not strictly to end World War II, but to intimidate the Soviets. In this view, Stalin’s takeover of Eastern Europe was a legitimate, defensive reaction to secure a buffer zone against a hostile, nuclear-armed, and economically aggressive capitalist West.
Look at the timing of the Marshall Plan (1947), which offered massive financial aid but required countries to open their economies to US markets. How might a cynical historian view this aid from the perspective of the US military-industrial complex and the need to prevent a post-war capitalist depression?
Look at the timing of the Marshall Plan (1947), which offered massive financial aid but required countries to open their economies to US markets. How might a cynical historian view this aid from the perspective of the US military-industrial complex and the need to prevent a post-war capitalist depression?
Did the US intervene in Europe to save democracy, or did they intervene to secure their own geopolitical interests, rebuild European markets for American exports, and encircle the Soviet Union?
Did the US intervene in Europe to save democracy, or did they intervene to secure their own geopolitical interests, rebuild European markets for American exports, and encircle the Soviet Union?
New Cold War History / Post-Revisionist: John Lewis Gaddis, Melvyn Leffler, Vladislav Zubok
New Cold War History / Post-Revisionist: John Lewis Gaddis, Melvyn Leffler, Vladislav Zubok
Utilizing declassified Soviet archives, these historians emphasize the "security dilemma," mutual misperception, and the massive power vacuum left by the collapse of Germany and Japan.
Zubok proves that Stalin was a cautious opportunist who did not have a master plan for world conquest, but whose brutal methods terrified the West.
Gaddis and Leffler highlight how neither side actually wanted a Cold War, but both sought security in ways that inherently threatened the other, accidentally locking the world into a rigid bipolar standoff.
The concept of the "security dilemma" suggests that actions taken by a state to increase its own security cause reactions from other states, which in turn lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state's security. How does this support the idea that the Cold War was caused by tragic miscalculation rather than a grand master plan by either Truman or Stalin?
The concept of the "security dilemma" suggests that actions taken by a state to increase its own security cause reactions from other states, which in turn lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state's security. How does this support the idea that the Cold War was caused by tragic miscalculation rather than a grand master plan by either Truman or Stalin?
In the 1990s, the Soviet Union collapsed and historians finally got to read Stalin's internal communications. Based on what we now know about Stalin's initial willingness to cooperate with the West (provided he got his buffer zone), who was actually pushing the escalation: a paranoid Stalin, an economically aggressive US, or the sheer structural reality of a bipolar world?
In the 1990s, the Soviet Union collapsed and historians finally got to read Stalin's internal communications. Based on what we now know about Stalin's initial willingness to cooperate with the West (provided he got his buffer zone), who was actually pushing the escalation: a paranoid Stalin, an economically aggressive US, or the sheer structural reality of a bipolar world?
Food for thought
Compare the geopolitical landscape in 1945 (the Yalta Conference and the Grand Alliance) to 1947 (the Truman Doctrine and the creation of the Cominform). How did the geographic focus shift? How did the nature of the relationship change from pragmatic military cooperation to rigid ideological warfare?
Compare the geopolitical landscape in 1945 (the Yalta Conference and the Grand Alliance) to 1947 (the Truman Doctrine and the creation of the Cominform). How did the geographic focus shift? How did the nature of the relationship change from pragmatic military cooperation to rigid ideological warfare?
What is a 'power vacuum'? How did the total destruction of Europe and Asia in World War II serve as the catalyst for how the US and USSR would compete to reshape the global order for the next forty years?
What is a 'power vacuum'? How did the total destruction of Europe and Asia in World War II serve as the catalyst for how the US and USSR would compete to reshape the global order for the next forty years?
Final thought: Was the Cold War inevitable the moment the common enemy of Nazi Germany was defeated, due to fundamentally incompatible ideologies, or was it the result of specific, avoidable policy choices and misjudgments by Truman and Stalin? Justify your answer.
Final thought: Was the Cold War inevitable the moment the common enemy of Nazi Germany was defeated, due to fundamentally incompatible ideologies, or was it the result of specific, avoidable policy choices and misjudgments by Truman and Stalin? Justify your answer.
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